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We analyze the relationship between product market competition and corruption. The 
existing theoretical literature produces ambiguous implications for the sign of this 
relationship, making it an empirical issue.  Unlike the existing empirical studies that use 
cross-country data, we test the relationship between competition and corruption using 
firm-level information. This approach overcomes serious estimation difficulties that 
result from relying on cross-country data. Contrary to the existing work, we show that 
greater product market competition is typically associated with greater corruption.  
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Corruption and Product Market Competition: An Empirical Investigation 
 
1. Introduction 
Control of corruption has been an important public policy issue both in developed 
and developing countries for many years. Encouraging competition in product markets 
represents one potential approach to dealing with corruption among officials regulating 
these markets that has attracted considerable attention in theoretical literature.1 This 
literature has demonstrated that the relationship between corruption and the degree of 
product markets competition is complicated and depends on various factors such as 
technologies employed by the firms, preferences of corrupt officials, probability of 
punishment, and information that the officials possess about firms. One exception to the 
generally ambiguous implications of these models is the prediction by Bliss and Di Tella 
(1997) that an increase in the firms’ fixed costs (that can be viewed as a sign of weaker 
product market competition in a given sector) decreases corruption, but this result was 
obtained under rather specific assumptions about the nature of the firms’ profits and 
costs, the relationship between firms and corrupt officials, and information possessed by 
these officials. The theoretical ambiguity of the link between product market competition 
and corruption highlights the importance of empirical testing of this relationship, and this 
testing represents the main goal of the present paper. 
Surprisingly, there has been little empirical analysis of the effect of product 
market competition on corruption. To the best of our knowledge, Ades and Di Tella 
(1999) and Emerson (2006) are the only two more or less substantial empirical studies 
that attempt to test this effect. Both papers use cross-country data to show that countries 
                                                 
1 See Bliss and Di Tella (1997), Ades and Di Tella (1999), Straub (2005) and Emerson (2006). 
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characterized by greater degree of product market competition tend to have less 
corruption as measured by subjective indices that relate to the entire country. The reliance 
on cross-country data, however, has obvious drawbacks, including small number of 
observations and the possibility of omitted variable bias. In addition, the degree of market 
competition in these papers is usually measured in rather indirect ways. For example, 
Ades and Di Tella use such measures as the share of imports in GDP, the importance of 
fuels and minerals in exports, and the distance to world’s major exporters while Emerson 
uses indicators of economy’s competitiveness as reflected in World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness rankings and the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic 
Freedom.  
Another significant drawback of the empirical approaches used by both Ades and 
Di Tella and by Emerson is the potential for reverse causality between corruption and 
competition that is difficult to adjust for.2 As Bliss and Di Tella (1997) emphasized, both 
the conventional measures of competition and the degree of corruption are typically 
jointly determined by “deep competition” parameters related to characteristics of the 
products produced by the firms and the technologies they use. 
The main goal of this paper is to provide an empirical investigation of the 
relationship between product market competition and corruption that alleviates, if not 
eliminates, the most important flaws of the existing work. In order to do this, we rely on a 
                                                 
2 Both papers attempt to deal with potential reverse causality by using 2SLS estimation. Ades and Di Tella 
instrument the intensity of competition (proxied by share of imports in GDP) with the logarithm of 
population and logarithm of land area. Emerson instruments corruption, which is a right-hand side variable 
in his empirical model, with a civil liberties index and variables reflecting educational level in a country. 
Neither author presents formal tests of the validity of these instruments. While there is little doubt that the 
instruments used in each paper are correlated with the respective variables being instrumented, it is unclear 
why these instruments would be uncorrelated with the residuals. Moreover, Emerson’s instruments are 
likely to be endogenous with the instrumented variable. That is, the degree of corruption in a country can 
easily affect its civil liberties and educational level via corruption’s effect on politics and on economic 
development, for example. 
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firm-level survey that in our view allows for better controls and instruments than cross-
country data.  
The relationship between product market competition and corruption generally 
depends on the particular nature of corruption and on the reasons for stronger or weaker 
competition, among other factors. Corruption based on the extraction of existing rents 
that are due to some artificial (non-technological) limits on competition is likely to 
flourish in less competitive environments. Also, if competition is weak due to excessive 
regulation, then it might be associated with greater corruption that is promoted by this 
regulation. In this case, appropriate deregulation would result in both greater competition 
and lower corruption. Our measure of corruption appears to reflect mostly its cost-
reducing variety. As we argue below, unlike rent extraction, corruption that reduces 
firms’ costs is likely to be promoted by product market competition. Our data support this 
argument. 
We use the dataset from the World Bank’s Productivity and the Investment 
Climate Private Enterprise Survey (henceforth, PICS) that contains responses from 
several thousand firms across a number of countries. Most of the firms were surveyed 
during 2002-2005 period and some of the countries contain two rounds of the survey, 
although this is not a panel dataset. By using firm-level data and country, industry, and 
year fixed effects we are able to greatly alleviate the problems plaguing previous 
empirical work on this issue. Unlike this earlier work, we demonstrate that firms in more 
competitive environments as measured by the number of firm’s competitors tend to pay a 
greater percentage of their sales in bribes, controlling for various firm-level 
characteristics and country, industry, and year fixed effects. While this relationship does 
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not always hold as strongly when we use some other measures of the degree of product 
market competition available in PICS, we do not find any evidence that competition and 
corruption are inversely related. We also demonstrate that capital-labor ratio as a proxy 
for the firm’s fixed costs -- a measure of deep market competition with respect to which 
Bliss and Di Tella obtained their unambiguous prediction – is indeed negatively related to 
the strength of competition as measured by the variables available from the survey (the 
number of competing firms, customer reaction to price increases, market share, and profit 
margin). We argue that the firm’s capital-labor ratio is usually representative of capital-
labor ratio in the firm’s narrow industry and is a valid instrument for dealing with the 
problem of endogeneity of corruption and competition. Also, as an alternative instrument, 
we use capital-labor ratio in the US sectors that correspond to the broad sectors available 
from the survey. In addition to capital-labor ratio, we use capacity utilization as an 
instrument for competition.  
While our Tobit regressions present mixed evidence, our instrumental regressions 
suggest a positive relations between the strength of competition and the extent of 
corruption. All coefficients in the instrumental regressions have signs consistent with this 
relationship and when we use the firm’s capital-labor ratio as one of the instruments, 
most of the coefficients of the competition measures are highly statistically significant. 
Moreover, the firm’s capital-labor ratio performs well in the standard tests for instrument 
validity. The difference in the results of Tobit regressions and instrumental regressions is 
instructive. It fits well with the conjecture of a substantial degree of reverse causality 
between competition and corruption.  Moreover, because we control for country and 
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broad industry sector fixed effects, the extent and nature of regulations as well as some 
other hard to measure factors are at least in part controlled for in our regressions.3 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the existing 
literature, focusing on the empirical implications of the models and on the existing 
empirical work. In addition, we suggest another simple model that implies a positive 
relationship between product market competition and cost-reducing corruption under 
some reasonable circumstances. We describe the data in Section 3. Our results are 
presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. The existing theory and evidence 
Most of the existing models of the relationship between product market 
competition and corruption produce ambiguous implications with respect to its sign. In 
the first paper analyzing this relationship, Bliss and Di Tella (1997) assume that each 
official deals with only one firm and the officials do not know the precise amount of rent 
enjoyed by the firm they oversee, but they know the distribution of these rents. The 
official’s problem then is to demand the bribe that maximizes the expected value of bribe 
revenue while the firm agrees to pay the bribe as long as it is smaller than the firm’s rent. 
If the bribe demanded is greater than the firm’s rent, the firm exits the market. The degree 
of competition in this model is based on three “deep competition” parameters: (1) the 
degree of substitutability of the firms’ products; (2) the degree of similarity of the firms’ 
production functions; and (3) the amount of fixed costs in the industry. In other words, in 
                                                 
3 Note that the “industries” whose fixed effects we control for are 15 rather broad sectors such as “Textiles” 
or “Metals and Machinery.” Therefore, the extent of competition faced by firms within these industries may 
vary greatly, depending on what part of the industry the firm operates in and in what part of the country it is 
located. 
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this paper, the degree of competition is determined by the technological factors that are 
assumed to be exogenous with respect to the degree of corruption. When the degree of 
competition in Bliss and Di Tella’s model depends on either the first or the second 
parameter, the relationship between competition and corruption measured by the size of 
the bribe demanded is ambiguous. If, however, the degree of competition is determined 
by the third parameter (i.e., fixed costs), greater competition always increases 
corruption.4  
Ades and Di Tella (1999) also assume that each official deals with only one firm, 
but unlike Bliss and Di Tella, they assume that the official knows precisely the firm’s 
amount of profit which is random and is not observed by the state. The official may 
collude with the firm to hide the true amount of profit in exchange for a bribe. If the bribe 
is detected by the state, however, the official loses his wage. The state’s problem is to set 
the officials’ wages in such a way as to reveal (and collect) the greatest amount of profit 
net of the officials’ wages. The degree of competition in this model is measured as the 
exogenous number of firms in the market and the extent of corruption is defined as the 
frequency of bribes with the amount of each bribe held constant. The assumed exogeneity 
of the number of firms implies that the direction of causality on which the model focuses 
is from competition to corruption. In this framework, corruption decreases in the number 
of firms unless increased competition leads the state to decrease the officials’ wages too 
much. In particular, if the wages do not depend on the number of firms in the economy, 
an increase in competition would always reduce the frequency of bribes.5 
                                                 
4 To prove this result, Bliss and Di Tella assume that the distribution of the firms’ overhead costs is 
uniform. 
5 A recent paper by Straub (2005) contains a model that is somewhat similar to Ades and Di Tella’s in that 
the number of firms is exogenous and the officials assigned to each firm have perfect information about the 
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The two models outlined above assume that the bribes represent pure extortion 
and are obtained from the firms’ pre-existing rents. Moreover, Ades and Di Tella’s 
(1999) results are contingent on the exogenous number of competitors. However, bribes 
are often paid in return for some service even if this service consists in letting the firm 
bypass some regulation that was established to facilitate bribe-taking. The important 
point here is that corrupt officials are not always free to extract firms’ rents, but can 
charge bribes only up to the value of the service they are providing to the firm. As 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) point out extortion is more difficult to hide and easier to fight 
than cost-reducing corruption such as when an importer pays a bribe instead of the 
official customs duty or a firm pays a bribe to avoid complying with costly regulations. 
Shleifer and Vishny note that “[c]ompetition between buyers of government services 
assures the spread of cost-reducing corruption” (p. 604) while such competition does not 
promote the spread of corruption of the extortion kind. The argument here is essentially 
that firms are likely to resist corruption when it represents pure extortion, but might 
welcome cost-reducing corruption.6 This suggests that cost-reducing corruption is likely 
to be more widespread than extortion. 
Cost-reducing bribes may be charged for reducing fixed costs or for reducing 
variable costs (this latter type of corruption would be more natural when bribes are 
                                                                                                                                                 
firms’ rents. The firm’s rents in this model depend on whether the firm uses a “good” technology that does 
not produce externalities or “bad” technology that is cheaper for the firm but generates a non-pecuniary 
negative externality for the consumers. The main result of Straub’s model relevant for our purposes is that a 
greater number of firms may either increase or decrease corruption measured as the aggregate amount of 
bribes. 
6 Sequeira and Djankov (2010) expand on Shleifer and Vishny’s agruments by classifying corruption into 
collusive and coercive. “ ‘Collusive’ corruption emerges when public officials and private agents collude to 
share rents generated by the illicit transaction… ‘Coercive’ corruption takes place when a public bureaucrat 
coerces a private agent to pay a fee just to gain access to the public service.” (pp. 12-13). Collusive 
corruption is always cost-reducing in Shleifer and Vishny sense and leads to an increased demand for 
public service while coercive corruption in cost-increasing, leading to lower demand. 
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charged in the course of day-to-day business rather than in a lump-sum fashion, e.g., 
when the firm needs to import supplies from time to time or obtain other official permits 
that depend on the level of output). It is straightforward to show that in a very basic 
model of Cournot competition with linear demand curves, when firms are paying bribes 
to reduce their costs (either fixed or variable) by a given amount, a decrease in the firms’ 
fixed costs (or equivalently, an increase in the number of competitors in the market) 
results in greater corruption measured either as the percentage of sales (the so-called, 
bribe tax) or as the total amount of bribes. 
Specifically, consider a market with Cournot competitors producing identical 
good at a constant marginal cost and with common to all firms fixed cost, f,7  and facing 






and qi is output of firm i. The fixed 
and marginal costs determine the number of firms in this market via a zero profit 
condition.8 Let’s assume that all firms have the same opportunities for cost reduction via 
a bribe and that the corrupt official obtains 100% of the cost saving. Denote each firm’s 
fixed cost reduction by )f and marginal cost reduction by )c. Then the total bribe and 
bribe tax in each case would be, respectively: 
                                                 
7 We use common fixed costs for simplicity. The outcome does not change if the fixed costs are 
heterogeneous and are scaled by a common parameter, e.g., firm i’s fixed cost is aif where f is common and 
ai’s are different. 
8 If all firms’ marginal costs are the same, N = |_(A – c)/ f  – 2_|, where |_._| denotes the greatest integer 
function. We treat N as a continuous variable. 
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Obviously, both total bribe and bribe tax increase in N (and, therefore, decrease in f ) in 
both cases.  
 We conclude that when the number of competitors is determined by technological 
fixed costs a la Bliss and Di Tella (1999) or when corruption is cost-reducing, the bribe 
tax is likely to be positively related to the degree of competition.  
Of course, as noted by Bliss and Di Tella (1997) among others, the number of 
competitors and the degree of corruption are in general endogenous and that’s how most 
papers model these two phenomena. In particular, the standard approach is to assume that 
in one way or another (e.g., via an entry fee bribe, or regulation, or by issuing licenses) 
the officials can restrict entry into the relevant industry and create rents that can be 
extorted. The officials then determine the extent of their restrictive action in order to 
maximize their bribe revenue. Recent examples of such papers include Campos et al. 
(2010), Emerson (2005), Dutta and Mishra (2004), and Aidt and Dutta (2001). Generally, 
an entry fee imposed by corrupt officials on firms that want to enter the market may 
reduce competition relative to a completely free entry case. However, causality here goes 
from corruption to competition rather than the other way around. Moreover, when 
regulations (or taxes) exist, corruption may result in greater entry than would be the case 
if regulators were honest, because paying bribes may be less costly for at least some firms 
than following regulations. Dutta and Mishra (2004) provide one example when in the 
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presence of regulations wealth inequality can lead to both greater corruption and 
increased product market competition.9  
To summarize, most models of the effect of product market competition on 
corruption have ambiguous implications with respect to the sign of this relationship, 
making the empirical investigation of this issue particularly relevant. Moreover, it is 
likely that greater technological fixed costs reduce both bribes and competition and that 
cost-reducing corruption increases in the number of competing firms (or, equivalently, 
decreases in fixed costs). This implies that the outcome of an empirical test of the 
relationship between competition and corruption depends on whether corruption 
measures used in the test reflect largely cost-reducing or extortion variety of corruption. 
Also, such tests need to take into account the potential endogeneity between corruption 
and product market competition.  
The existing empirical work claims to show that product market competition 
reduces corruption. This work, however, is based mostly on cross-country data and 
suffers from serious econometric problems.10 Particularly important is the fact that the 
existing empirical studies are not able to disentangle adequately the impact of 
competition on corruption from the reverse effect. Also, it is unclear whether corruption 
measures used in these studies reflect rent extortion or cost reducing corruption. In the 
                                                 
9 Regulations may, of course, be a result of corruption, but presumably some taxes and regulations would 
also exist without corruption. 
10 Dutta and Mishra (2004) use a subset of the firm-level data from a precursor to the survey that we use in 
the next section, but their empirical work is limited to motivating their theoretical model. Their entire 
empirical exercise consists of regressing the ratio of corrupt to non-corrupt firms in a survey of 23 
economies in transition on the number of firms in each country sample and the Gini index for the country. 
(They assume that the number of firms in the survey reflects the number of firms in the country.) Also, they 
do not claim that causality runs from the degree of competition to corruption. Also, Campos et al. (2010) 
use a survey of Brazilian manufacturing firms to show that corruption is positively associated with 
incumbent firm performance. They argue that this presents an indirect evidence of corruption acting as a 
barrier to entry. Here again, causality runs from corruption to competition. Also, competition in their 
empirical work is reflected in a highly indirect way by assuming that incumbent firm performance is 
inversely related to the strength of competition. 
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next section we use firm-level data and rely on capacity utilization and on a proxy for 
fixed costs to alleviate, if not eliminate, the problems plaguing the existing empirical 
literature on this issue. Contrary to the results based on cross-country studies, our data 
that measure mostly cost-reducing corruption suggest that product market competition 
either does not affect the extent of corruption or is associated with greater corruption, 
measured as the ratio of bribes to firm sales (i.e., bribe tax). The results are particularly 
strong when we adjust for the potential endogeneity between corruption and competition. 
 
3. The Data and Estimation Approach 
In order to test the relationship between competition in product markets and 
corruption faced by the firms we rely on the firm-level Productivity and the Investment 
Climate Private Enterprise Survey (PICS). This World Bank sponsored survey was 
administered to several thousand firms in a number of countries, mostly in 2002-2005. 
After dropping observations that do not contain information on the variables relevant to 
our analysis, we end up using usually from about 2,200 to 9,000 observations on 
manufacturing firms, depending on regression specification.  
Our dependent variable is a measure of corruption that we refer to as the bribe 
tax. It equals a fraction of annual sales paid in bribes reported by firm i in country c and 
in year t.11 Note that bribe tax reflects “informal payments to public officials to ‘get 
things done’ with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc.” (see Table 
1). That is, at least on its face, this question is likely to be interpreted as  being about 
cost-reducing corruption rather than extortion of rents. According to our theory, this 
                                                 
11 As is common practice in surveys, the questions about the extent of corruption concern “unofficial 
payments” typically made by “firms like yours” rather than by the respondent himself. See Table 1. 
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measure should be positively influenced by the strength of competition. Also note that 
many of the firms in the survey reported zero values for bribe tax. Therefore, we run the 
following Tobit regressions:  
 
BRIBE_TAXict = (0+(1(COMPETITIONict)+(2Xict+(3Zct+ict ,  (1) 
 
where BRIBE_TAXict represents a measure of corruption (a fraction of annual sales paid 
in bribes) reported by firm i in country c and in year t,12, Xict is a vector of other firm 
characteristics, and Zct is a vector of country, 15 broad manufacturing sectors, and year 
fixed effects.  
As we mentioned earlier, competition and corruption are likely to be endogenous. 
In particular, corrupt officials may attempt to limit competition among firms they 
oversee. In order to adjust for this possibility, we instrument competition by either the 
firm’s or broad industry’s capital-labor ratio and by the firm’s capacity utilization. We 
view capital-labor ratio as a proxy for the firm’s fixed costs – one of Bliss and DiTella’s 
parameters that determine the strength of competition faced by the firm. Obviously, it is 
not a perfect proxy for fixed costs, but it is probably a fairly good proxy and it does most 
likely represent a so-called innocent entry barrier.  Such barriers arise due to industry 
characteristics and result from profit maximization that does not necessarily include 
strategic behavior.13 Other things equal, the higher the capital-labor ratio the more 
difficult it is to enter the industry.  
                                                 
12 As is common practice in surveys, the questions about the extent of corruption concern “unofficial 
payments” typically made by “firms like yours” rather than by the respondent himself. See Table 1. 
13 Of course, a firm might wish to overinvest strategically in its capacity in order to deter entry. Such 
investment might also increase the firm’s capital-labor ratio. 
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 One might argue that it would be better to use survey-based capital-labor ratio for 
the industry rather than for a particular firm as a measure of competition within the 
industry. Unfortunately, as we noted earlier, the survey has only 15 rather broad 
categories of manufacturing industries such as “Textiles” or “Metals and Machinery” that 
have a wide range of capital-labor ratios among respondent firms. For example, in 
Electronics, firms’ capital-labor ratios have ranged from 0 to over $250,000 per 
employee, with a mean of about $610 and standard deviation of almost $7,600. Also, 
capital-labor ratios for a given industry in a given country obtained from the survey are 
not necessarily reflective of purely technological characteristics of the industry, but 
maybe influenced by the country’s economic environment just as much as ratios for 
individual firms. The problematic nature of using capital-labor ratio averages from the 
survey’s broad industries is highlighted by the fact that these averages are positively 
related to the strength of competition reported by the firms in these industries. 
 Another possibility would be to use capital-labor ratios for the corresponding US 
industries as instruments. These ratios are fairly strongly negatively related to 
competition reported by respondent firms. However, when we use US capital-labor ratios 
and capacity utilization reported by firms as instruments, the instrumental regressions fail 
the overidentification tests in some specifications. 14 Presumably this happens because 
US capital-labor ratios serve a role similar to broad industry dummy variables and as 
such may influence the degree of corruption via channels other than competition.  
                                                 
14 Interestingly, the US capital-labor ratios are negatively correlated with the industry averages of these 
ratios from the enterprise survey with the coefficient of correlation of about -.22. This result further 
undermines the validity of using PICS-based capital-labor ratios of the broad industrial sectors for our 
purposes. 
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Therefore, we contend that the respondent firm’s capital-labor ratio provides the 
best indication of fixed costs in its narrowly defined industry while we use dummy 
variables for broad industry categories available from the survey as control variables. The 
firm’s own capital-labor ratio may be endogenous to bribes, because, for example, the 
process of obtaining licenses for installing or use of fixed capital may be corrupt. If this is 
the case, however, capital-labor ratio would be positively related to the bribe tax while in 
our data the relationship is strongly negative. Moreover, the number of licenses would 
presumably depend on the total assets of the firm rather than on the capital-labor ratio. As 
a robustness check we also use capital-labor ratios for the US industries corresponding to 
the 15 broad sectors listed in the survey. The US industry ratios have the advantage that 
they are clearly exogenous to the corruption environment facing firms in the survey. 
However, these capital-labor ratios do not necessarily reflect the technology in a more 
narrow industries of the firms in the survey and US technologies may not be the same as 
those used in other countries.  
We construct our firm capital-labor ratio variable as a logarithm of one plus a 
ratio of the firm’s fixed assets to its employment. PICS has two measures of fixed assets:  
“machinery and equipment” and “plant, property, and equipment.” We use book value of 
the former measure, because it has about five times as many observations as the other 
measure. In the survey, this book value is expressed in local currency units (LCU). We 
convert it into constant purchasing power parity (PPP) US Dollars using the ratio for the 
appropriate year of the country’s GDP in current LCU and its GDP in constant 2000 PPP 
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US Dollars.15 The (logarithm of) US capital-labor ratios are calculated for 2004 and are 
defined as the amount of capital in current US dollars per employee. 
The use of our proxy for the firms’ fixed costs (the firm’s capital-labor ratio) and 
a measure of capacity utilization is supported by the fact that they are not only negatively 
related to the measures of competition available from the survey (the number of firm’s 
competitors, a crude measure of the price elasticity of demand, firm’s market share, and 
the firm’s gross profit margin) but they also pass instruments validity tests for our 
measures of competition in the competition-corruption relationship. In particular, they 
easily pass overidentification tests, implying that capital-labor ratio is unlikely to be 
related to corruption through channels other than their tendency to restrict competition.  
In addition to capital-labor ratio, we also use the survey measure of capacity 
utilization by the firm as an instrument for competition. While in the models of strategic 
behavior of firms extra capacity is typically viewed as entry deterrence, the more 
common effect of low capacity utilization is greater competition. Bertrand competition is 
particularly natural in the low capacity utilization environment. A casual look at the US 
market for air travel suggests as much. Conversely, high capacity utilization usually 
weakens competition.  For example, Tirole (1992) several times mentions capacity 
constraints as a reason for noncompetitive behavior and “softer” competition.16 
Therefore, we expect capacity utilization to be negatively related to the strength of 
competition. At the same time, one could argue that firms that shield themselves from 
competition with the help of corrupt officials might have relatively predictable demand 
                                                 
15 We also used GDP in constant 2000 USD. The results were similar to those presented in the paper and 
are available upon request. 
16 E.g., pp. 211, 217, 218, and 410. Also, outside of monopoly setting, the public good nature of entry 
deterrence may significantly weaken incentives to increase capacity as a means of preventing entry; see 
Waldman (1987).  
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and achieve high capacity utilization. If this is the case, then capacity utilization would be 
endogenous to corruption and, therefore, would not be a good instrument for our 
purposes. Because of this argument, we view capital-labor ratio as a more reliable 
instrument, although we believe that capacity utilization is only very modestly affected 
by the degree of corruption. We present the IV regression results both for one instrument 
(capital-labor ratio) and for two instruments for those specifications where capital-labor 
ratio is a sufficiently strong instrument. As we demonstrate in the next section, the results 
are broadly similar, although two-instrument regressions perform better in terms of 
statistical significance and strength of instruments tests. Also, the presence of two 
instruments allows for overidentification tests.  
The survey has several measures of the intensity of competition faced by 
respondents: number of competitors, national and local market share, the extent of 
customer reaction on price increase, and markup over firm’s costs. Each of these 
measures has advantages and disadvantages.  We calculate the first measure as the 
logarithm of one plus the number of competitors the firm has. PICS breaks down 
competitors into three categories -- domestic private, domestic state, and foreign. We add 
up these numbers to obtain total number of competitors. For each category, there is the 
actual number of competitors and also a code with nine different intervals for the number 
of competitors. The interval code is meant to be used when the respondent cannot 
indicate the precise number of competitors. We create a combined measure that uses the 
specific number of competitors if it is present and the number inferred from the code if 
the specific number of competitors is absent. In the latter case, we use midpoints of the 
coded intervals and we use 30 competitors for the “more than 20” open-ended interval. 
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Some respondents indicated very large numbers of competitors (e.g., hundreds of 
thousand).  Given our use of logarithms, this does not generate significant difficulties. 
Nonetheless, we also obtained the results when we use 30 for all cases where the specific 
number of competitors was stated to be over 30. These results are similar to those that use 
an unadjusted number of competitors and we do not present them here. They are 
available upon request. The main problem with the number of competitors as a measure 
of competition is that a dominant firm that has some small competitors may not be 
threatened by them in any significant way. At the same time, the theory of contestable 
markets suggests that even a complete absence of competitors may not reflect the lack of 
strong potential competition if entry costs are relatively low. 
Another measure evaluates customer reaction to a 10% price increase. This 
variable has four values: 1 if customers would buy the same quantity as before; 2 if 
demand would be slightly lower; 3 if the demand would be much lower; and 4 if the 
customers stop buying. In other words, higher values of this variable presumably reflect 
greater competition faced by the firm. The limited set of values of this variable 
complicates our ability to instrument it and the difficulty of estimating the consequences 
of a hypothetical price increase makes the results of the regressions that use this variable 
somewhat difficult to interpret.  
The third variable potentially relevant to competition is market share reported by 
the firm. The survey asks about both local market share and national market share. (In 
our regressions, we use logarithm of one plus reported market share in percentages.) It is 
unclear, however, which of the two shares is most appropriate for our purposes, not to 
mention the fact that the firm might be competing mostly in international markets. This 
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ambiguity is a serious flaw and we view these market share variables as the least reliable 
of the measures of the strength of competition. In order to alleviate the problem with the 
relevant market share, we calculate another variable equal to the maximum of the two 
market shares. Our assumption here is that the greatest market share would typically be 
the most relevant one. For example, if a firm has zero national market share and positive 
local market share, it is presumably the local share that is most relevant to the degree of 
competition faced by the firm. We present our results for the national market share and 
for the maximum of the two shares. We do present the local market share results because 
there are relatively few observations on the local market share and in no regression the 
coefficient of local market share is statistically significant.  
Finally, we calculate the price markup over costs reported by the firm. This 
markup is calculated as the ratio of the difference between total market value of 
production and the firm’s costs to the firm’s costs. In those cases when the respondent did 
not report total market value of production we used total sales instead. This measure has 
two main disadvantages. First, the firm’s costs presumably do not include bribes. 
Therefore, firms that pay high bribes to reduce their costs may appear as enjoying high 
markups while in reality their bribe-inclusive markups may be modest. This possibility 
makes interpretation of results somewhat uncertain and it also suggests that markups may 
be endogenous to bribe tax. Another difficulty with this measure is that there are a few 
observations where markup is negative and very high (in hundreds or even thousands) by 
absolute value. Given that positive markups are always less than unity, a few negative 
outliers can be extremely influential. Also, highly negative markups may indicate a 
reporting error. For these reasons we replace all markups that are less than -0.1 by -0.1. 
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We also control for various firm characteristics that can be expected to influence 
the degree of corruption engaged in by the firm. In our main regressions these firm-
specific control variables include the percentage of government ownership (State 
Owned), the percentage of foreign ownership (Foreign Owned), firm size measured by a 
logarithm of one plus employment, age of the firm, and the share of sales the firm exports 
directly. In addition, all of our regressions include country and year fixed effects. The 
regressions that do not use industry-wide capital-labor ratios also include industry fixed 
effects.  
A description of all our variables and the summary statistics are presented in 
Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Table 3 shows pairwise correlations of firm-level variables.  
 
4. The Results 
Tobit regressions 
We begin by Tobit estimation of equation (1) using our four measures of 
competition (we treat national market share and “maximum” market share as essentially 
one measure of the degree of competition) . The results are presented in Table 4. All 
regressions in this table control for country, year, and broad manufacturing sector fixed 
effects, and adjust for arbitrary correlation within country-manufacturing sector groups 
(clustering).17  
Tobit estimates provide a mixed picture. The coefficients of the number of 
competitors and markup (Columns 1 and 4) are not statistically significant, customer 
                                                 
17 That is, each cluster is comprised of firms from the same country and the same broad manufacturing 
sector. See Table 1 for the list of countries and 15 manufacturing sectors. The results of regressions that 
adjust for possible clustering are close to those without clustering, which is not surprising, given that the 
intra-group correlation of the bribe tax is less than 0.1. 
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reaction coefficient suggests a positive relationship while market share coefficients are 
consistent with negative relationship between corruption and competition. As we will see, 
however, reverse causality plays an important role. Also, we reiterate that market share 
variables in PICS are not reliable measures of competition, because it is unclear which 
market share (local, national or even international) is most relevant for each firm. 
It is also of some interest to consider the relationship between corruption and the 
other firm-level characteristics. Among these, foreign ownership and state ownership 
have consistently negative signs (one exception is a small and statistically insignificant 
positive coefficient of foreign ownership in the markup specification) and are statistically 
significant in some specifications. Foreign owners may be reluctant to engage in 
corruption if these foreign owners come from countries with relatively strong anti-
corruption laws and traditions (including laws against corruption practices engage in 
abroad). They also may not always know which officials can be bribed relatively safely. 
There are, however, opposite arguments as well. Some foreign-owned firms may choose 
to pay large bribes simply because they are not skilled in the alternative ways of lobbying 
in the local culture.18 It appears that in our data, the first set of reasons dominates. State 
ownership is likely to be associated with fewer bribes to state officials simply because 
state owners might have alternative ways of influencing other state officials. This 
reasoning underlines the ambiguous property rights literature (Li, 1996; Che and Qian, 
                                                 
18 Rose-Ackerman (1978) contains the following example. “A Washington Post article described the Asian 
perspective. Some Asian businessmen contend ‘that their American partners often insist on paying a lot of 
money in bribes because they cannot be bothered to do things in the time-honored way of endless talk over 
tea. They therefore end up paying several times more in bribes than is necessary or even acceptable.’ ” (p. 
90, footnote 6). 
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1998).19 Larger cities as well as capitals are positively linked to corruption in all but one 
equation and in all specifications at least one of their coefficients is statistically 
significant. In most specifications, export share in sales has a negative coefficient, but 
usually it is not statistically significant. This is somewhat surprising, given that exporting 
necessitates interactions with customs, i.e., an additional group of officials. Firm size also 
does not appear to be significantly associated with corruption. Finally, the age of the firm 
has a negative coefficient that is statistically significant for two out of our four 
specifications. This might be due to older firms being able to work out relatively stable 
arrangement with corrupt officials that involve lower bribes. All these issues deserve a 
more detailed inquiry and discussion, but they are not the focus of this paper. 
 
Instrumental variables estimation 
Clearly, the potential simultaneity bias between corruption and the intensity of 
product market competition represents a problem in estimating the relationship between 
them. Note, however, that this simultaneity is likely to bias the estimates of the 
coefficients of the number of firm’s competitors and of customer reaction in Tobit 
estimates of equation (1) downwards and the coefficients of market shares  and of 
markups upwards. We expect, therefore, that the IV estimates of equation (1) should 
show a more definite positive relationship between the degree of competition and 
corruption. The results below strongly support these expectations. In all specifications, 
the IV estimates are consistent with a positive relationship between competition and 
corruption and when we use only firm-level instruments, the coefficients of our measures 
                                                 
19 It is quite possible, however, that the propensity of enterprises with state ownership to engage in bribing 
depends on the nature of state ownership (e.g., whether the owner is local government or central 
government). Unfortunately, our data do not distinguish among different types of state ownership. 
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of competition are highly statistically significant in all but one specification. The lone 
exception is customer reaction specification that is particularly difficult to instrument 
because of the discrete nature of this measure of competition. 
We first discuss the results obtained by using firm capital-labor ratio as one of the 
instruments and later present the estimates that use capital-labor ratio for US industries. 
We run both IV GMM regressions and IV Tobit regressions. Even though IV Tobit is 
clearly more appropriate in our case, IV GMM regressions are also useful because they 
provide a richer set of diagnostics for the quality of our instruments. Table 5 contains the 
estimates of the relationship between our measures of competition and our instruments 
(firm’s capital-labor ratio and capacity utilization) that form the first-stage estimates of 
the IV GMM regressions. (First stage regressions for IV Tobit are essentially the same.) 
These regressions show that both instruments are negatively and statistically significantly 
related to the strength of competition, no matter which measure of competition we use. 
This suggests among other things that the surveyed firms do not tend to use excess 
capacity as a barrier to entry. Instead, excess capacity leads to stronger competition while 
capacity constraints soften it. 
 Table 6 shows the second stage estimates of the IV GMM regressions. All 
regressions include (partialled out) fixed effects for country, year, and broad 
manufacturing sector, and adjust for clustering on country-manufacturing sector groups. 
The most remarkable result is that market shares that had positive coefficients in the non-
instrumental regressions now have negative coefficients that are statistically significant at 
1% level. The number of competitors and markups are also significant at 1% level.  
 26
The instruments are quite strong in the specifications with the number of 
competitors and with national and maximum market shares. In these regressions, the F-
statistic for excluded instruments is comfortably greater than 10 (see Table 6). In the 
customer reaction and markup equations, however, the instrument strength is only 
moderate. In all specifications, the instruments comfortably pass overidentification tests 
(Hansen J statistic), supporting our view that both capital-labor ratio of the firm and its 
capacity utilization affect corruption mainly via their impact on the strength of 
competition. 
The IV Tobit estimates of the competition-corruption relationship have the same 
signs as IV GMM estimates, but with the exception of the markup specification, IV Tobit 
coefficients of the competition measures are smaller by absolute value than the 
corresponding IV GMM coefficients. Statistical significance is similar in both 
approaches.  
In terms of economic importance, the Tobit results imply that the elasticity of the 
bribe tax both with respect to the number of competitors and with respect to market share 
measures is somewhat greater than 0.5 by absolute value. For our markup measure, a 0.1 
decrease in it (less than one half of its standard deviation of 0.23) results in an increase of 
about 6 percentage points (or more than one standard deviation) of the bribe tax if 
calculations are done at its mean of 1.5%. In other words, the effect of competition on 
corruption is quite significant both statistically and from the economic point of view. In 
fact the effect of the markup on bribes tax appears to be unreasonably large, suggesting 
that the true value of the markup coefficient is probably below its point estimate. 
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IV Tobit procedure in Stata does not provide overidentification tests. However, 
we can mimic them by running the regressions with one instruments and checking 
statistical significance of the other instrument in the second stage regression. Neither 
capital-labor ratio nor capacity utilization is statistically significant in any of the second 
stage regressions with one instrument.20 This result is consistent with overidentification 
tests reported by the IV GMM procedures and both support the validity of both 
instruments.  
While overidentification tests suggest that firm capital-labor ratio affects 
corruption largely through its effect on competition, the issue of potential endogeneity 
between firm capital-labor ratio and corruption remains open. Therefore, we also estimate 
equation (1) using capital-labor ratio for US industries as one of the instruments. Tables 8 
and 9 present the results of the first and second stages of IV GMM regressions, 
respectively, with US industry capital-labor ratios as one of the instruments. The 
advantage of using the US ratios is that they are presumably mostly technologically 
determined and are clearly exogenous to the corruption environment facing firms in other 
countries. There are drawbacks too, however. As mentioned earlier, the industry 
definitions in the survey are too broad and may not adequately reflect the technological 
constraints of respondent firms and, therefore, their competitive environment. In addition, 
we cannot use industry fixed effects in this case. The data show that US capital-labor 
ratios provide for strong instruments in the number of competitors and in market share 
specifications, but not in the other two specifications. Also, as Hanson J-statistics in 
Table 9 demonstrate, these IV regressions fail the overidentification test in market share 
regressions.  This implies that broad industrial sector capital-labor ratios are likely to 
                                                 
20 Note that IV Tobit fails to produce estimates when capacity utilization is the single excluded instrument. 
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affect corruption through channels other than competition in this case. Aside from the 
problems with overidentification tests, the signs of the competition measures in these 
regressions are consistent with a positive relationship between competition and 
corruption, but in the number of competitors and in market share specifications the 
relevant coefficients are not statistically significant. Similar results obtain for IV Tobit 
regressions (see Table 10). 
 
5. Conclusion 
We study the relationship between product market competition and corruption. 
Most of the existing theoretical literature arrives at ambiguous results with respect to this 
relationship. We argue, however, that the link between product market competition and 
corruption to a large extent depends on the nature of the latter. While surplus-shifting 
corruption might indeed be negatively linked to the of strength competition, cost-
reducing corruption is likely to be promoted by competition. Nonetheless, the empirical 
work on this issue that has generally dealt with broad measures of corruption has 
uniformly claimed to show that stronger product market competition is associated with 
lower corruption. In contrast, our estimates suggest that stronger competition is 
associated with greater cost-reducing corruption. This result is particularly strong when 
we adjust for the potential endogeneity between corruption and competition.  
An important advantage of our approach over the existing empirical work is the 
use of firm-level instead of cross-country data. Firm-level data let us utilize information 
specific to the competitive and institutional environment of particular firms rather than 
rely on countrywide measures that reflect the degree of competition and corruption in 
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highly aggregated and sometimes indirect ways. In addition, our data allow for the use of 
apparently valid instruments to deal with the potential simultaneity between competition 
and corruption. Finally, large number of observations and the ability to employ various 
firm-level controls and country, year, and manufacturing sector fixed effects adds to the 
reliability of our results.  
Our findings do not necessarily contradict the existing literature, but rather call 
for a more nuanced view of corruption emphasizing the need to distinguish between 
surplus-shifting and cost-reducing corruption.  
We certainly do not view our results as an argument against promoting product 
market competition among firms. The effect of competition even on cost-reducing 
corruption depends significantly on the factors that restrict competition. For example, if 
competition is restricted by excessive regulations, the removal of these regulations is 
likely to both reduce corruption and facilitate competition. Our findings do imply that 
other things being equal competition by itself does not tend to reduce corruption and may 
even promote it. Moreover, whatever effect competition has on corruption, it is 
presumably dwarfed by its well known welfare improving properties. Our results suggest, 
however, that corruption reduction is not necessarily one of them. 
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Table 1.  Variables and Sources  
Variable Definition and Source 
 Source for firm-level variables: World Bank Productivity and Investment Climate Survey, 2002-2005; 
the survey form is available at World Bank (2002) 
 
Bribe Tax Logarithm of one plus the percentage of annual sales paid in bribes as indicated in the 
answer to the following question:  
We’ve heard that establishments are sometimes required to make gifts or informal 
payments to public officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, 
licenses, regulations, services etc. On average, what percent of annual sales value 
would such expenses cost a typical firm like yours? ____ %  
Capacity 
utilization 
Answer to the question: What was this establishment’s average capacity utilization 
over the last year? (in %)
Capital Dummy variable that has a value of 1 if the firm (establishment) is located in the 
country’s capital and a value of zero otherwise. 
Capital-labor Ratio 
reported by firms  
Logarithm of one plus the ratio of the net book value of machinery and equipment 
(including transport) to the number of employees. The book value is converted from 
local currency units to the constant 2000 US Dollars using the ratio of the country’s 
GDP in local currency to the country’s purchasing power parity GDP in USD. 
Capital-labor Ratio 
of US industries 
Logarithm of the 2005 ratio of the industry’s capital assets in thousands of 2000 US$ 
to the number of employees. Calculated from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Capital Tables (http://www.bls.gov/mfp/mprdload.htm) and the Survey of US 
Manufacturers (http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/IBQTable?_bm=y&-
ds_name=AM0431GS102). 
City size Logarithm of the population of the city where the firm (establishment) is located. City 
size is calculated as midpoints of the following intervals:  250,000-1million; 
50,000-250,000; less than 50,000 population. Population of 1.5 million was 
assumed for cities categorized as “Over 1 million population” by the 
respondents. Population of capital cities was obtained from World 
Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision, United Nations Publications, 
2006.  
 
Customer reaction Answers to the question: 
If you were to raise your prices of your main product line or main line of services 
10% above their current level in the domestic market (after allowing for any inflation) 
which of the following would best describe the result assuming that your competitors 
maintained their current prices? (select one of the options below).  
1. Our customers would continue to buy from us in the same quantities as now  
2. Our customers would continue to buy from us, but at slightly lower quantities  
3. Our customers would continue to buy from us, but at much lower quantities  
4. Our customers would stop buying from us.  
Employment Logarithm of the number of firm’s employees 
Export  The percentage of the firm’s sales that are exported directly (as opposed to being 
exported via a distributor).  
Firm Age Logarithm of the difference between 2006 and the year the firm was established. 
Foreign Owned The percentage of foreign ownership of the firm. 
Manufacturing 
sector  
A dummy variable for one of the following 15 broad manufacturing sectors: Textiles, 
Leather, Garments, Food, Beverages, Metals and machinery, Electronics, Chemicals 
and pharmaceutics, Wood and furniture, Non-metallic and plastic materials, Paper, 
Sporting goods, Auto and auto components, Other transport equipment, Other 
manufacturing 
Market share (local 
and national) 
Logarithm of one plus market share determined from answers to the following: 
a. Within your main product line, what share of the local market in your city or town 
is made up by the sales of your establishment? ____ %  
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b. Within your main product line, what share of the national market is made up by the 
sales of your establishment? ____ % 
Market share 
(maximum) 
The maximum of the above two measures of market share. 
Markup The ratio of the difference between total market value of production and production 
costs (raw materials, energy, manpower, interest and financial fees, overhead, and 
“other” costs) to total market value of production. In cases where total market value of 
production was not reported but total sales were, total sales were used. Markup values 
lower than -0.1 were replaced by -0.1.  
Number of 
Competitors 
Logarithm of one plus the sum of the numbers of domestic private, domestic state, and 
foreign competitors in the domestic market. In cases where one or two of these three 
categories of competitors contain missing values, zero competitors is assumed for the 
respective categories. If all three categories are missing, the variable is coded as 
missing value. When specific number of competitors is not indicated by the 
respondent, the number is inferred from the categorical variable that has three 
intervals for the number of competitors being more than 10 (11-15, 16-20, and more 
than 21). For the last open-ended interval, 30 competitors is assumed.  
State Owned The percentage of state ownership of the firm. 
Countries and 






Algeria, 2002 (63), Bangladesh, 2002 (896), Cambodia, 2003 (9), Chile, 2004 (632), 
China, 2002 (448), Costa Rica, 2005 (238), Ecuador, 2003 (52), Egypt, 2004 (755), El 
Salvador, 2003 (279), Eritrea, 2002 (23), Guatemala, 2003 (357), Guyana, 2004 (135), 
Honduras, 2003 (286), Indonesia, 2003 (513), Kyrgyzstan, 2003 (78), Lithuania, 2004 
(29), Madagascar, 2005 (172), Malawi, 2005 (103), Mauritius, 2005 (105), Moldova, 
2003 (45), Nicaragua, 2003 (328), Oman, 2003 (41), Pakistan, 2002 (115), 
Philippines, 2003 (577), Poland, 2003 (60), South Africa, 2003 (455), Sri Lanka, 2004 
(351), Tajikistan, 2003 (54), Tanzania, 2003 (80), Turkey, 2005 (620), Uzbekistan, 
2003 (69), Vietnam 2005 (703), Zambia, 2002 (57) 
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics 
 
 
Note: Summary statistics are presented for the actual variable values (not their 
logarithms) for the observations that are used in at least some of the regressions. 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Bribe Tax  1.50 4.98 0 100 13,917 
Capacity utilization 74.9 21.4 0 100 13,624 
Capital 0.335 0.472 0 1 13,917 
Capital-labor Ratio (firm) 1,943 31,924 0 1,411,296 6,170 
Capital-labor ratio (US; $1000’s) 91.9 53.1 32.3 218.1 13,705 
City size 1,106,274 1,814,561 1260 1.11e+7 13,917 
Customer reaction 2.58 1.07 1 4 8,273 
Employment 187.2 584.5 1 19,453 13,917 
Export  15.7 30.0 0 100 13,917 
Firm Age 21.6 19.4 1 264 13,917 
Foreign Owned 9.93 27.3 0 100 13,917 
Market share (national) 26.1 30.9 0 100 5,507 
Market share (maximum) 30.7 31.4 1 100 5,619 
Number of Competitors 103 737 0 40,000 4,871 
Markup 0.110 0.234 -0.1 0.999 2,706 
State Owned 5.07 20.6 0 100 13,917 
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Table 3. Pairwise correlations 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Bribe Tax 1.00                
2. Cap. util. -.072 1.00               
3. Capital .100 -.028 1.00              
4. K/L (firm) -.089 .033 -.106 1.00             
5. K/L (US) -.049 .008 -.018 .155 1.00            
6. City size -.016 -.057 .305 .027 .081 1.00           
7. Cust. reac. .005 -.076 -.011 .002 -.010 -.024 1.00          
8. Empl-t -.004 .079 .041 .059 .056 .021 -.026 1.00         
9. Export -.003 .084 .040 -.003 -.122 -.086 -.016 .392 1.00        
10. Age -.081 -.090 -.021 .062 .087 .057 .020 .277 .021 1.00       
11. For. own.  -.024 .057 .012 .051 .063 .029 -.012 .255 .264 -.038 1.00      
12. Market 
share (nat.) 
.052 .084 .116 .101 .195 -.044 -.115 .155 -.053 .097 .043 1.00     
13. Market 
share (max.) 
.054 .076 .096 .091 .149 -.061 -.121 .062 -.107 .078 .016 .907 1.00    
14. Markup .041 .080 .065 .135 -.058 -.053 -.283 -.027 -.020 -.046 .087 .036 .096 1.00   
15. # Comp. .108 .051 .147 -.085 -.138 -.170 .035 .077 .076 -.078 -.132 -.206 -.215 .096 1.00  
16. St. own. -.029 -.045 -.032 .048 .078 .015 -.036 .213 -.015 .207 -.074 .050 .016 -.029 .001 1.00 
 
Note: correlations presented in the above table are among variables actually used in the regressions, including those that were 
converted into logarithms.
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Table 4. Tobit regressions  
   
Dependent variable: Logarithm of one plus bribe tax 








(.018) - - - 
Market share 
(maximum) - - 
.046** 
(.018) - - 
Customer 
reaction - - - 
.042** 
(.018) - 
Markup - - - . - -.003 (.230) 













































































R-squared .119 .111 .109 .063 .104 
Observations 4706 5334 5446 8142 2706 
Left-censored 
observations 2317 3052 3138 5107 1947 
 
Notes:  (1) All regressions use country, year, and manufacturing sector fixed effects; 
(2) *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5. Fist stages of GMM instrumental variables regressions for Bribe Tax  
 
1st stage dependent 







































































































R-squared .032 .013 .061 .052 .015 
F-stat. for excluded 











Observations/clusters 3899/126 1629/91 3593/124 3675/125 2105/87 
 
Notes:  (1) All regressions use country, year, and manufacturing sector fixed effects and  
adjust for possible clustering on country and manufacturing sector groups;   
(2) Robust (heteroskedasticity adjusted) standard errors of coefficients are in parenthesis;    
(3) *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively 
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Table 6. Second stage GMM instrumental variables regressions for bribe tax 
(excluded instruments: firm’s capital-labor ratio and capacity utilization)  
 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of one plus bribe tax 
Variable name (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Number of competitors .303*** 
(.088) - - - - 
Customer reaction - .198 (.242) - - - 
Market share (national) - - -.332*** (.108) - - 
Market share 
(maximum) - - - 
-.316*** 
(.107) - 
Markup - - - - -3.30*** (1.23) 


















































































Observations/clusters 3899/126 1629/91 3593/124 3675/125 2105/87 
 
Notes:  (1) All regressions use country, year, and manufacturing sector fixed effects and  
adjust for possible clustering on country and manufacturing sector groups;   
(2) Robust (heteroskedasticity adjusted) standard errors of coefficients are in parenthesis;    
(3) *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively 
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Table 7. Second stages of Tobit instrumental variables regressions for bribe tax  
(excluded instruments: firm’s capital-labor ratios and capacity utilization) 
 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of one plus bribe tax 
Variable name (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Number of competitors .463** 
(.207) - - - - 
Customer reaction - .555 (.561) - - - 
Market share (national) - - -.615*** (.231) - - 
Market share 
(maximum) - - - 
-.588*** 
(.232) - 
Markup - - - - -12.4*** (4.38) 






































































Observations/clusters 3899/126 1629/91 3593/124 3675/125 2105/87 
Left-censored obs. 1886 902 1986 2051 1620 
P-value for Wald 
exogeneity test .038 .320 .003 .004 .004 
 
Notes:  (1) All regressions use country, year, and manufacturing sector fixed effects and  
adjust for possible clustering on country and manufacturing sector groups;   
(2) Robust (heteroskedasticity adjusted) standard errors of coefficients are in 
parenthesis;    
(3) *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively 
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Table 8. Fist stages of GMM instrumental variables regressions for Bribe Tax  
 
1st stage dependent 







































































































R-squared .039 .010 .066 .059 .013 
F-stat. for excluded 











Observations/clusters 4530/144 8050/447 5247/344 5355/345 2561/112 
 
Notes:  (1) All regressions use country, year, and manufacturing sector fixed effects and  
adjust for possible clustering on country and manufacturing sector groups;   
(2) Robust (heteroskedasticity adjusted) standard errors of coefficients are in parenthesis;    
(3) *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively 
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Table 9. Second stage GMM instrumental variables regressions for bribe tax 
(excluded instruments: US capital-labor ratio and firm’s capacity utilization)  
 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of one plus bribe tax 
Variable name (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Number of competitors .101 
(.098) - - - - 
Customer reaction - .175* (.098) - - - 
Market share (national) - - -.095 (.072) - - 
Market share 
(maximum) - - - 
-.083 
(.070) - 
Markup - - - - -2.53** (1.03) 


















































































Observations/clusters 4530/144 8050/447 5247/344 5355/345 2561/112 
 
Notes:  (1) All regressions use country and year fixed effects and adjust for possible clustering on 
country and manufacturing sector groups;   
(2) Robust (heteroskedasticity adjusted) standard errors of coefficients are in parenthesis;    




Table 10. Second stages of Tobit instrumental variables regressions for bribe tax  
(excluded instruments: US capital-labor ratios and capacity utilization) 
 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of one plus bribe tax 
Variable name (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of competitors .152 
(.179) - - - 
Customer reaction - .531** (.237) - - 
Market share (national) - - -.216 (.177) - 
Markup - - - -8.60** (3.73) 
























































Observations/clusters 4530/144 8050/447 5247/344 2561/112 
Left-censored obs. 2238 5037 2993 1883 
P-value for Wald 
exogeneity test .507 .037 .124 .020 
 
Notes:  (1) All regressions use country, year, and manufacturing sector fixed effects and  
adjust for possible clustering on country and manufacturing sector groups;   
(2) Robust (heteroskedasticity adjusted) standard errors of coefficients are in 
parenthesis;    
(3) *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively 
